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Abstract 
 
In this paper we have used the Compustat data-set covering 1983-2003 to test empirically whether 
a firms' capital structure follows "optimal capital structure" or” pecking order theory"(POT) as 
advanced by Professor Stewart Myers. Using the industry mean as a predictor of a firm's capital 
structure, we have found that in general, a firm's debt level is moving toward the industry's mean 
is not significantly different from that it is moving further away from the industry mean, while a 
firm's debt level is moving toward the industry mean is very high when it is above the industry 
mean.   
 
The empirical result suggests that the optimal capital structure is not a single point, rather a 
range of values from zero to the industry mean within which a typical U.S. firm will be indifferent 
to the firm's debt level.  In other words, a firm will only adjust to the optimal capital structure 
when the firm's debt level is out of this range.  Out result also generally agrees with the pecking 
order theory, that is, firms prefer using internal financing as opposed to using external financing.  
Furthermore, when external funds are required, a firm prefers debt financing to equity financing. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
he optimal capital structure theory evolved through the writings of Franco Modigliani and Merton 
Miller (MM, 1958).  At first they proposed that, in a world of no income taxes and transaction costs, 
a firm’s capital structure is irrelevant to its value.  But with the introduction of corporation income 
taxes and transaction costs (MM, 1963), it was proposed that a firm would use its debt financing judiciously so that 
its tax saving would balance its chance of potential bankruptcy.  Hence the evolution of the notion of optimal capital 
structure where the debt/equity mix would be such that the firm’s weighted average cost of capital would be 
minimized and its value would be maximized.  DeAngelo and Masulis in their famous 1980 article had articulated in 
such a way that the proposition came to be known as the "optimal capital structure.” 
 
In 1982 Bowen, Daley and Huber, Jr. (BDH) had provided a technique by which we can test the optimal capital 
structure.  They proposed that an individual firm’s debt structure tend to converge to its industry mean over time.  Marsh 
(1982) had concluded that “companies do appear to make the choice of financing instrument as though they had target 
levels in mind for both long-term debt ratios and the ratio of short-term to total debt.”  Stewart Myers in his seminal 
article (1984) had proposed the pecking order theory (POT) -- that firms choose internal capital at first, i.e., the use of 
retained earnings.  And when external capital is needed, they choose debt capital, and only equity capital as the last 
resort.  Taggart (1986) used POT in his study of capital structure and found that the pecking order hypothesis was more 
valid than the optimal capital structure hypothesis. 
 
More recently, E.T. Claggett, Jr. (1992) tested the optimal capital structure theory and had found that long-term 
debt to total assets ratio, for the most part, tended to move toward the most recent previous industry mean within one 
year.  I general, in more firms with above the industry mean long-term debt ratios adjusted toward the industry mean 
T 
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than with below the industry mean ratios.  Claggett, Jr. also found that firms normally behave in a manner consistent 
with the pecking order theory, but some firms may not adjust during periods of severe turmoil. 
 
 In our previous article (1999), we also had tested both the optimal capital structure hypothesis and pecking 
order hypothesis and found that firms would adjust their capital structure toward the industry mean when it was 
above the mean, but that firms below the industry mean would adjust their capital structure toward the industry 
mean rather sluggishly.  But our study had also shown that both the optimal capital structure hypothesis and the 
pecking order hypothesis coexisted during the period covered by our study (1974-1992).  In that article we had used 
the data collected from Fortune magazine's largest 500 United States companies.  Here we will test the two 
hypothesis anew with the help of Compustat data-base.  Also, we will advance the years from 1983 to 2001 in order 
to take up more recent time period of the United States industries. 
 
 Methodological Framework  
 
To test the optimal capital structure theory we have employed two methodologies in this paper. The first 
methodology we have pursued here was introduced by BDH first and later refined by E. T. Claggett, Jr. where a 
two-by-two contingency table was formulated.  The nonparametric Fisher Exact Probability (FEP) test and later the 
Goodman-Kruskal Gamma measures were employed to analyze the data.  To examine whether firms converge their 
capital structure toward their industry mean, the two-by-two matrix was analyzed for each year (across industry) and 
each industry (across year) in the following manner: 
 
      Figure 1 
 
Number of firms below (L)   Number of firms below (L) 
         that did correct                                                             that did not correct 
Number of firms above (H)   Number of firms above (H) 
        that did not correct                                                          that did correct 
 
 
The hypothesis tested by this procedure is that gamma is significantly different from zero.  If there is no 
statistical significance we conclude that there is no discernable trend to move toward or away from the industry mean 
capital structure.  The results are shown in Tables 1 through 4.  
 
 To test the POT, a two-by-four matrix was analyzed for each industry (across year), for each year (across 
industry), and for all observations pooled.  Figure 2 describes the matrix: 
 
 
Figure 2 
  
Number of firms   Number of firms   Number of firms    Number of firms 
below (L) that     below (L) that     below (L) that      below (L) that  
passive (P)        issued debt (D)    issued equity(E)    issued both (B) 
 
Number of firms   Number of firms   Number of firms    Number of firms 
above (H) that     above (H) that     above (H) that      above (H) that 
were passive(P)    issued debt (D)    issued equity(E)    issued both (B) 
 
 
 For each Figure 2 matrix, an estimate of G and the associated test statistic (Z) were calculated.  Here the 
hypothesis is that G is significantly different from zero.  If there is no significance, we conclude that there is no 
support for Pecking Order Theory.  But if G is significant and the sign is positive (+), we will interpret that as a 
corroboration of the POT. The result is shown in Table 5 and 6. 
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Empirical Results 
 
 In Table 1, we find that for the measure of LTD/TA, 18 out of the 21 industries had Z statistics which were 
positive and significant either at the 1 percent or 5 percent level (two-tail test).  For the measure of TD/TA, 19 
industries had significant Z statistics, while for the measure of TE/TA, 19 industries also had significant Z statistics 
either at the 1 percent or 5 percent level.  The pooled data also shows this tendency toward convergence when the Z 
statistics for all of the three measures were significant at 1 percent level.  These results strongly indicate that firms 
do converge toward their respective industry mean, thus supporting the optimal capital structure hypothesis. 
 
 
Table 1: Summary of Capital Structure Symmetric Convergence, By Industry 1983-2001 
 
LTD/TA-- Long term debt over total assets; TD/TA--- Total debt over total assets; TE/TA--- Total equity over total assets. 
         LTD/TA        TD/TA             TE/TA 
Industry       Obs.       Gamma  Z-Tes        Gamma Z-Test            Gamma      Z-Test 
Aerospace     290        0.138 1.675         0.339 4.339**              0.357    4.598** 
Apparel      780        0.532              12.393**         0.133 2.660**              0.575  13.89** 
Beverage      123        0.577 5.538**         0.260 2.111*              0.261    2.124* 
Building Materials     117        0.317 2.560*         0.208 1.630              0.088    0.677   
Chemicals     258        0.416 5.201**         0.371 4.534**              0.288    3.421** 
Computers, Office Equip.    243        0.518 6.669**         0.368 4.360**              0.494    6.270** 
Electronics, Elec. Equip.    454        0.391 6.409**         0.364 5.892**              0.444    7.470** 
Food      345        0.424                6.148**         0.418 6.038**              0.463    6.852** 
Forest Products     389        0.497 7.980**         0.425 6.545**              0.569    9.654** 
Industrial & Farm Equip.    260        0.250 2.938**         0.332 4.012**              0.245    2.880** 
Metal Products     224        0.395 4.551**         0.248 2.711**              0.292    3.235** 
Metals      290        0.015 0.176          0.426 5.670**              0.366    4.733** 
Mining, Crude oil Prod.    130        0.302 2.555*         0.553 5.351**              0.436    3.906** 
Motor Vehicles & Parts    356        0.246 3.384**         0.424 6.240**              0.201    2.736** 
Petroleum Refining     987        0.266 6.127**         0.360 8.567**              0.346    8.189** 
Pharmaceuticals     330        0.520 7.823**         0.478 6.981**                0.610    9.901** 
Publishing, Printing    458        0.423 7.070**         0.400 6.597**              0.488    8.469** 
Sci. & Photo Equip.       232        0.394 4.615**         0.406 4.787**              0.377    4.385** 
Soaps, Cosmetics     267        0.509 6.836**         0.460 5.985**              0.325    3.967** 
Textile      126        0.167 1.340          0.040 0.317              0.171    1.378   
Tobacco      114        0.355 2.867**         0.040 0.300              0.370    3.003** 
Total    6773        0.309              18.903**         0.391             24.743**              0.398  25.22** 
* significant at 5% level. 
** significant at 1% level. 
 
 
 Table 2 shows he convergence toward the industry mean within one year.  Here, for the LTD/TA measure 
of capital structure the Z statistics were significant in 17 out of 19 years, either at the 1 percent or 5 percent level.  
But for the TD/TA measure of capital structure, the Z statistics were significant only in 10 out of 19 years.  
However, the results were much better for the industry convergence when TE/TA measure was taken into account.  
Here the Z statistics were significant in 14 out of 19 years.  The pooled data were also significant at the 1 percent 
level for all the three measures of capital structure.  Thus both Tables 1 and 2 support the conclusions reached by 
Jalilvand and Harris (1984), Lev (1969), Marsh (1982), and Claggett, Jr. (1992), but not by BDH (1982), where they 
found no significant convergence over one-year intervals. 
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Table 2: Summary of Capital Structure Symmetric Convergence, By Year 1983-2001 
 
LTD/TA-- Long term debt over total assets; TD/TA--- Total debt over total assets; TE/TA--- Total equity over total assets. 
        LTD/TA   TD/TA    TE/TA 
Year       Obs.       Gamma Z-Test  Gamma  Z-Test  Gamma            Z-Test 
1983       297         0.368 4.822**  0.358 4.667** 0.312 4.005** 
1984       314         0.326 4.321**  0.301 3.953** 0.281 3.669** 
1985       318         0.199 2.567*  0.194 2.491* 0.336 4.501** 
1986       320         0.225 2.915**  0.140 1.785 0.149 1.911 
1987        321         0.214 2.779**  0.082 1.048 0.202 2.614** 
1988        332         0.396 5.550**  0.094 1.222 0.096 1.243 
1989        334         0.140 1.833   0.099 1.280 0.168 2.203* 
1990        350         0.369 5.245**  0.134 1.784 0.019 0.252 
1991        352         0.201 2.722**  0.219 2.976** 0.034 0.453 
1992        353         0.405 5.880**  0.322 4.518** 0.276 3.811** 
1993        360         0.122 1.650  0.098 1.325 0.203 2.776** 
1994        371         0.194 2.690**  0.110 1.507 0.185 2.568* 
1995        379         0.941 38.408**  0.003 0.043 0.151 2.108* 
1996        384         0.357 5.287**  0.283 4.087** 0.410 6.230** 
1997        384         0.255 3.657**  0.948 41.442** 0.986 80.95** 
1998        395         0.183 2.621**  0.147 2.082* 0.315 4.670** 
1999        398         0.139 1.985*  0.121 1.726 0.286 4.208** 
2000        400         0.201 2.908**  0.153 2.192* 0.124 1.774 
2001        411         0.299 4.484**  0.219 3.224** 0.373 5.758** 
Total      6773         0.309 18.903**  0.391 24.743** 0.398 25.22** 
 
* Significant at 5% level. 
** Significant at 1% level. 
 
 
 In Table 3, we have shown the summary of asymmetric convergence by industry during 1983-2001.  This 
table strongly corroborates the conclusion of table 1 that the majority of firms had converged their LTD/TD ratios 
toward their industry means.  Here 17 out of 21 industries had convergence with the Z statistics either at the 1 
percent or at the 5 percent level of significance, while for the measure of TD/TA, 12 industries had convergence 
with the Z statistics significant either at the 1 percent or 5 percent level of significance.  But in the case of TE/TA 
ratio, only 6 industries had convergence either at the 1 percent or 5 percent level of significance.  Also, in the 
majority of industries the negative signs of the Z statistics meant that the convergence came from above.  This again 
supports the results obtained by Claggett, Jr. (1992), that the convergence toward the industry mean came most often 
from firms above their industry mean LTD/TA ratios.  The pooled data for all these measures of capital structure 
also confirms the result of convergence which were significant at the 1 percent level of significance.  
 
 In Table 4 we have calculated the gamma values and the Z statistics for the asymmetric convergence by 
year.  We find that the Z statistics were significant in 14 out of 19 years for the LTD/TA measure, while for both the 
TD/TA and TE/TA measures, 11 out of 19 years had the Z statistics significant either at the 1 percent or 5 percent 
level of significance.  Also, the negative signs for the majority of years (except for the TE/TA measure, meant that 
the convergence movement came from above, as seen in the case of the majority of industries.  The pooled data for 
only the LTD/TA measure showed the negative sign, meaning that the convergence toward the industry mean came 
from the above. 
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Table 3: Summary of Capital Structure Asymmetric Convergence, By Industry 1983-2001 
 
LTD/TA-- Long term debt over total assets; TD/TA--- Total debt over total assets; TE/TA--- Total equity over total assets. 
    LTD/TA   TD/TA         TE/TA 
Industry   Obs. Gamma           Z-Test Gamma   Z-Test       Gamma   Z-Test 
Aerospace  90 -0.531        -7.552** -0.255  -3.181**      -0.140  -1.698 
Apparel   80 -0.487       -11.017** -0.332  -6.945**       0.051   1.003 
Beverage   23  0.443          3.870** -0.062  -0.487      -0.505  -4.589** 
Building Materials  17 -0.414         -3.474**  0.043   0.330      -0.113  -0.867 
Chemicals  58  0.180          2.083* -0.197  -2.283*       -0.227  -2.642** 
Computers, Office Equip. 243 -0.144         -1.602  0.029   0.319      -0.080  -0.882 
Electronics, Elec. Equip 454 -0.417         -6.909** -0.150  -2.293*       0.012   0.178 
Food   345 -0.288         -3.949** -0.167  -2.227       0.008   0.100 
Forest Products  389 -0.033         -0.463 -0.011  -0.146      -0.156  -2.206* 
Industrial & Farm Equip. 260 -0.224         -2.626** -0.223  -2.609**       0.065   0.744 
Metal Products  224 -0.402         -4.639** -0.127  -1.358      -0.026  -0.279 
Metals   290 -0.448         -6.040** -0.352  -4.529**      -0.157  -1.911 
Mining, Crude oil Prod. 130 -0.175         -1.430 -0.107  -0.871       0.133   1.079 
Motor Vehicles & Parts 356 -0.205         -2.797** -0.231  -3.168**       0.116   1.560 
Petroleum Refining  987 -0.288         -6.670** -0.245  -5.605**      -0.156  -3.513** 
Pharmaceuticals  330 -0.559         -8.668**  0.022   0.288      -0.130  -1.679 
Publishing, Printing 458 -0.281         -4.422** -0.184  -2.838**       0.034   0.521 
Sci. & Photo Equip. 232 -0.536         -6.833** -0.153  -1.670       0.263   2.930** 
Soaps, Cosmetics  267  0.227          2.698**  0.225   2.666**       0.216   2.557** 
Textile   126 -0.443         -3.920** -0.400  -3.468**       0.122   0.972 
Tobacco   114 -0.638         -6.262  0.533   4.760**       0.152   1.164 
Total   6773 -0.330        -20.323  0.165   9.714**        0.081  4.740** 
* Significant at 5% level. 
** Significant at 1% level. 
 
 
Table 4: Summary of Capital Structure Asymmetric Convergence, By Year 1983-2001 
 
LTD/TA-- Long term debt over total assets; TD/TA--- Total debt over total assets; TE/TA--- Total equity over total assets. 
   LTD/TA  TD/TA    TE/TA 
Industry  Obs. Gamma  Z-Test  Gamma  Z-Test         Gamma  Z-Test 
1983  297 -0.200  -2.461*   0.595   8.923**          0.693 11.575** 
1984  314  0.171   3.431**  -0.762               -23.25**          0.542 12.724** 
1985  318 -0.761  -9.202**  -0.327  -2.712**          0.224   1.799 
1986  320 -0.550  -5.034**  -0.277  -2.206*          0.045   0.344 
1987  321  0.470   6.046**  -0.257  -3.020         -0.451 -5.739** 
1988  332 -0.642  -9.219**   0.026   0.291         -0.359  4.241** 
1989  334 -0.296  -4.671**  -0.199  -3.052**          0.110  1.663 
1990  350 -0.509  -7.758**  -0.317  -4.387**          0.132  1.750 
1991  352  0.104   1.455  -0.648  -11.861**         0.284  4.124** 
1992  353 -0.579  -8.098**  -0.604  -8.645**         -0.257 -3.032** 
1993  360 -0.531  -6.637**  -0.081  -0.857         -0.219 -2.374* 
1994  371 -0.180  -2.198*  -0.219  -2.707**         -0.291 -3.658** 
1995  379 -0.025  -0.200   0.026   0.213         -0.086 -0.693 
1996  384 -0.120  -1.609   0.106   1.417         -0.428 -6.312** 
1997  384 -0.332  -7.814**  -0.129  -2.893**         -0.094 -2.086* 
1998  395 -0.158  -2.057*  -0.145  -1.884         -0.096 -1.239 
1999  398 -0.212  -3.280**   0.116   1.766         -0.152 -2.327 
2000  400 -0.044  -0.473  -0.303  -3.419**          0.211  2.322* 
2001  411  0.129   1.507  -0.095  -1.102        -0.051 -0.596 
Total  6773 -0.330               -20.323   0.165   9.714**         0.081  4.740** 
 
* Significant at 5% level. 
**Significant at 1% level. 
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 Table 5 shows the results for pecking order preference by industry during 1983-2001 for the LTD/TA 
measure of capital structure.  Claggett, Jr. (1992) found strong support for pecking order behavior except for two 
industries – newspaper publishing and the retail sector.  Here we find that all the industries taken in our sample had 
positive and significant Z-test for their gamma values at the 1 percent level of significance.  The pooled data also 
corroborates this result which were highly significant at the 1 percent level of significance. 
 
 Table 6 presents the results for the pecking order preference by year during 1983-2001 for the LTD/TA 
measure.  Again consistent with Claggett, Jr. (1992), all the years taken in our sample had positive and significant 
gamma values at the 1 percent level of significance.  Furthermore, the pooled data showed that the gamma values 
were significant for all the years covered by our study at the 1 percent level of significance. 
 
 
Table 5: Summary of Test for Pecking Order Preference By Industry, 1983-2001 
 
Industry     Obs.                Gamma        Z-test 
Aerospace    290   0.593   8.875255** 
Apparel     780   0.723   20.67572** 
Beverage     123   0.642   6.574953** 
Building Materials    117   0.604   5.795713** 
Chemicals    258   0.684   10.63591** 
Computers, Office Equip.   243   0.781   13.77979** 
Electronics, Elec. Equip.   454   0.755   17.32723** 
Food     345   0.530   8.217197** 
Forest Products    389   0.579   9.913620** 
Industrial & Farm Equip.   260   0.772   13.86212** 
Metal Products    224   0.610   8.156889** 
Metals     290   0.621   9.537569** 
Mining, Crude oil Prod.   130   0.529   5.031159** 
Motor Vehicles & Parts   356   0.738   14.57250** 
Petroleum Refining    987   0.636   18.32556** 
Pharmaceuticals    330   0.571   8.926712** 
Publishing, Printing   458   0.671   13.67932** 
Sci. & Photo Equip.   232   0.634   8.827903** 
Soaps, Cosmetics    267   0.683   10.79606** 
Textile     126   0.554   5.286185** 
Tobacco     114   0.566   5.179273** 
Total     6773   0.648   49.56342** 
* Significant at 5% level. 
** Significant at 1% level. 
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Table 6:  Summary of Test for Pecking Order Preference By Year, 1983-2001 
 
Year     Obs.   Gamma        Z-test 
1983    297     0.728   12.95068** 
1984    314     0.740   13.79375** 
1985    318     0.700   12.34297** 
1986    320     0.688   12.00360** 
1987    321     0.762   14.92497** 
1988    332     0.627   10.38265** 
1989    334     0.654   11.16777** 
1990    350     0.716   13.55721** 
1991    352     0.570   9.213560** 
1992    353     0.692   12.74742** 
1993    360     0.614   10.42675** 
1994    371     0.682   12.68721** 
1995    379     0.744   15.33496** 
1996    384     0.641   11.57363** 
1997    384     0.703   13.69777** 
1998    395     0.602   10.59079** 
1999    398     0.703   13.93338** 
2000    400     0.552   9.369940** 
2001    411     0.669   12.90738** 
Total    6773     0.648   49.56342** 
* Significant at 5% level. 
** Significant at 1% level. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The empirical results show that firms will adjust their capital structure toward the industry mean when it is 
above the mean. But the probability that firms adjust the capital structure toward the industry mean is very low when 
it is below the mean, indicating that firms are indifferent to the debt level as long as it is below the industry mean. 
To explain this phenomenon, we developed the concept of optimal capital structure range within which a typical 
U.S. firm will be indifferent to its debt level. The empirical results strongly suggest that the likelihood a firm will 
use the internal financing as opposed to the external financing is very high. Furthermore, when a firm needs external 
financing, it generally prefers debt to equity. Our study thus shows that both the optimal capital structure hypothesis 
and the pecking order hypothesis coexist and that they are not mutually exclusive, as Claggett, Jr. had found.  But 
the pecking order hypothesis is more pronounced than the optimal capital structure hypothesis as the former was 
significant for all the industries and for all the years, while the latter was significant for the majority of industries 
and for the majority of the years covered by our study.  
 
 Why does a firm adjust the capital structure toward the industry mean when it is above the mean, while it is 
indifferent when the capital structure is below the mean? The possible explanation for this is as follows: when a 
firm's debt level reaches a significantly high level, the high cost of the debt associated with the high leverage makes 
the reduction of the debt a meaningful task. That is why we observe more firms adjusting their debt level downward. 
But the firms which have below average debt level do not put the consideration of debt level as their first priority. 
Some other factors, such as the availability of the funds and market conditions may also play an important role in the 
consideration of the firm's capital structure. 
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